

In critically assessing the merits and viability of the emerging transdisciplinary project of historical social science, this course will address the following thematic foci:

I. Philosophy of Science

- i. the ontology of the social-historical
 - * time and place as *constitutive mediums* of social life, intrinsic to both meaningful agency and processes of structuration
 - * the formation of minded selves, roles, institutions, and social orders as historical phenomena
 - * on causality and contexts
- ii. the epistemic foundations of historiography: critical realism or skeptical, postmodern “constructivism”?
 - * the past-as-it-happened and past-as-imagined, as ideologically reconstructed, commemorated
 - * the “historiographical operation” (Barthes, De Certeau, Hayden White)
 - * “arduous confrontations” of evidence and theory (E.P. Thompson)
- iii. levels of abstraction and concreteness in historical social science
 - * ideal types revisited - analytical vs. historical concepts

II. Historical Social Science as Theory

- i. the logic of contextual-sequential analysis
 - * the *via media* between transhistorical generalizations and particularistic narrations: social phenomena to be explicated by tracing both their genesis and their intrinsic relations to other mediating structures and processes
 - * history as part of the present, owing to the rootedness of present structural and cultural arrangements in past practices; of “chronotopes” and “trajectories”
- ii. concept-formation and historical-comparative generalization
 - * cases and the so-called “small N” problem
 - * excursus on the use of secondary sources
- iii. theorizing agency, structure, and culture as temporal phenomena
 - * on time and place as culturally defined apperceptions that provide essential frames of meaning for social action (i.e., the sequentially-ordered and site specific nature of most forms of reflexive agency)
 - * on path-dependence: present arrangements—institutions, cultural forms—are the cumulative and selectively reproduced products of past social actions, which in turn provide the basis for future endeavours and aspirations

III. Methods in Historical Social Science

- i. on historical evidence: remnants, records, residua
 - * typically clustered, catenated & so “narrative entailing”
 - * as objectifications of human intentionality, and thus characterized by “social authenticity” and “implicative density” (or multivalence)

ii. hermeneutics and the “construction” of narratives

- * canons of interpretation, *verstehen*, and the hermeneutic circle
- * colligation, emplotment, rhetoric
- * on the integration of so-called “first-order” accounts (phenomenological or ideological representations by the agents themselves) and “second-order” synthesizing narratives that objectively situate and contextualize the subjective experiences of the actors
- * from “chaotic chronicle” to the narrative logic of situated social action (historical sociology)

iii. reflexive protocols for enhanced objectivity

- * source criticism
- * the sociology of knowledge and “epistemic vigilance”

TEXTS and READINGS:

For background, you will find these two volumes quite helpful:

Theda Skocpol, ed., *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, Cambridge University Press, 1984.

T. McDonald, ed., *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*, University of Michigan Press, 1999.

& A list of digitally available assigned readings, addressing methodological and theoretical concerns, as well as exemplars of historical-sociological research. ** I have annotated a number of the Readings, but you can remove.

1 **Essay**, due at the end of term (50 pts), based on your research interests or field (~8000 words).

5 **Position Papers** (4 pts each = 20 pts), drawing out key implications from the readings (~800 words each).

1 **Seminar Presentation** (20 pts), to provide a critical overview and discussion platform for the readings and related works for the topic of your choice; include discussion of a recent contribution on the issues (say, publication within 5 years or so). One of the five Position Papers can expand upon your presentation.

1 short critical **Reflection Piece** (10 pts. ~1000 words).

Late assignments will be subject to penalty (1 pt. per day), unless compliant with University regulations (see below).

This course will follow a conventional seminar format: dialogue and reasoned argumentation will constitute the operating principles for our shared inquiry and exploration. Your questions, observations, and criticisms are necessary in promoting rounded and reflective discussion, and will be appreciated.

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To have mastered ‘theory’ and ‘method’ is to have become a self-conscious thinker... To be mastered by “method” or “theory” is simply to be kept from working, from trying, that is, to find out about something that is going on in the world. C. Wright Mills

The knowledge of fragments, studied by turns, each for its own sake, will never produce knowledge of the whole; it will not even produce knowledge of the fragments themselves. (la connaissance des fragments, étudiés successivement, chacun pour soi, ne procurera jamais celle du tout ; elle ne procurera même pas celle des fragments eux-mêmes) Marc Bloch

SOC 6401H - *THEORY AND METHOD IN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY*

Week 1 ***Introduction: History and the Social Sciences***

Jan. 6

Reading: J.M. Bryant & John Hall, "Towards Integration and Unity in the Human Sciences: The Project of Historical Sociology," Introduction to *Historical Methods in the Social Sciences, Volume I*, pp. i-xv.

Recommended: Andrew Abbott, "History and Sociology: The Lost Synthesis," *Social Science History*, 1991, 15/2: 201-38, and related essays in his *Time Matters*, 2001. Terrence McDonald, "What We Talk about When We Talk about History: The Conversations of History and Sociology," pp.91-118; and Craig Calhoun, "The Rise and Domestication of Historical Sociology," pp.305-338, both in McDonald, ed., *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*, 1999. See also Wallerstein, et al., *Open the Social Sciences*, 1996.

*** A comprehensive collection of foundational texts is now available, in *Historical Methods in the Social Sciences*, IV volumes, edited by John A. Hall & Joseph M. Bryant, Sage Publications, 2005:

<i>Volume I.</i>	<i>Historical Social Science: Presuppositions and Prescriptions</i>	
<i>Volume II.</i>	<i>Foundations of Historical-Sociological Inquiry</i>	
<i>Volume III.</i>	<i>The Logic of Historical-Sociological Analysis</i>	
<i>Volume IV.</i>	<i>Social Worlds in Flux: Legacies and Transformations</i>	[Call number: HM487]

Week 2 ***On Scientific Explanation: The Methodenstreit Revisited***

Jan. 13

Reading: Max Weber, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy (a selection)," chap. II, pp. 67-112 in M. Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, 1949.

Supplemental: An excellent overview is provided by Peter Manicas, *A History & Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 1987. A foundational collection is Frederick Suppe, ed., *The Structure of Scientific Theories*, 1977, covering the rise and fall of logical positivism. Much practical wisdom is to be found in Andrew Abbott, *Methods of Discovery: Heuristics for the Social Sciences*, 2004. Classic contributions: May Brodbeck, ed., *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 1968; and Maurice Natanson, ed., *Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader*, 1963 (with a strong phenomenological orientation). Quentin Skinner's edited volume, *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*, 1985, offers informative sketches of Althusser, the Annales Historians, Derrida, Foucault, Gadamer, Habermas, Kuhn, Levi-Strauss, and Rawls. Pierre Bourdieu, J-C Chamboredon, and J-C Passeron, *The Craft of Sociology: Epistemological Preliminaries*, 1991, insightfully links philosophy to research practice; see also Bourdieu's *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology*, 1990. From anthropology, Clifford Geertz, *Available Light*, 2000, offers a series of brilliant meditations on a number of interpretive disputes and challenges. See also William Roseberry, *Anthropologies and Histories*, 1994, and Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object*, 2002. Pertinent reflections by a historian are found in Geoff Eley, *A Crooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of Society*, 2005.

Week 3 ***On the Ontology of the Social-Historical:
Jan. 20 Nominalism, Social Realism, and Dialectical Totality***

Readings: Theodore Adorno, "Sociology and Empirical Research," pp. 68-86 in Adorno, et al., *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, 1976. Peter Berger and Stanley Pullberg, "Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness," *History and Theory*, 1965, 4/2: 196-211.

Supplemental: E. Gellner, "Holism versus Individualism in History and Sociology," and J. Watkins, "Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences," pp. 488-515 in Patrick Gardiner, ed., *Theories of History*, 1959. C. Castoriadis, "The Social-Historical," chap. 4 in *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, 1998. John Wilson, "Realist Philosophy as a Foundation for Marxian Social Theory," *Current Perspectives in Social Theory* 1982 (3):243-63. M. Archer, Roy Bhaskar, et al., eds., *Critical Realism: Essential Readings*, 1998. See also Jean-Paul Sartre's short programmatic work, *Search for a Method*, 1963; more dauntingly, his *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, 1960. Raymond Aron, *History and the Dialectic of Violence*, 1973, offers a critical assessment. Synoptically lucid is Y.Yovel, "Existentialism and Historical Dialectic," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 1979, 39/4: 480-97. For background, on Dilthey, Heidegger, Ortega y Gasset, consult Howard Tuttle, *The Dawn of Historical Reason*, 1994. See also Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Crisis of The Understanding," chapter 14, pp. 318-37, in *The Essential Writings of Merleau-Ponty*, 1969. Judicious and informed is James Miller, "Merleau-Ponty's Marxism," *History and Theory*, 1976, 15/2: 109-32. Wide-ranging is Mustafa Emirbayer, "Manifesto for a Relational Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1997, 103/2: 281-317. Also noteworthy: Fredric Jameson, "Marxism and Historicism," *New Literary History*, 1979, 11:41-73; and Joseph Fracchia, "Dialectical Itineraries," *History and Theory*, 1991, 38/2: 169-97. For a Wittgensteinian approach, Rom Harré, "Forward to Aristotle: the Case for a Hybrid Ontology," *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 1997, 27 (2/3):173-91; more extended, Theodore Schatzki, *The Site of the Social*, 2002. Ian Hacking's collection, *Historical Ontology*, 2004, contains several thought-provoking explorations. On the hazards of reification and the deletion of human agency through conceptual nominalization, see Michael Billig, "The Language of Critical Discourse Analysis: The Case of Nominalization," *Discourse & Society*, 2008, 19/6: 783-800.

Week 4 ***Questions of Causality and Temporalities of the Social***
Jan. 27

Readings: Jean-Paul Sartre, "Temporality: Phenomenology of the Three Temporal Dimensions," pp.83-105 in *Being and Nothingness*, 1956. Raymond Martin, "Causes, Conditions, and Causal Importance," *History and Theory*, 1982, 21/1: 53-74.

Supplemental: Herbert Marcuse, "Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism," *Telos*, 1969, 4: 3-34. Fernand Braudel, "History and the Social Sciences: The *Longue Durée*," pp. 25-54 in his *On History*, 1980. A. Abbott, "On the Concept of Turning Point," *Comparative Social Research* 1997 (16): 85-105. Michael Scriven, "Causes, Connections and Conditions in History," pp.238-64 in W. Dray, ed., *Philosophical Analysis and History*, 1966. G. H. Mead, "History and the Experimental Method" and "Time," chaps. 12 & 13 (pp.319-41) in *On Social Psychology* (Selected Papers), 1964. R. Aminzade, "Historical Sociology and Time," *Sociological Methods & Research*, 1992, 20/4: 456-80. G. Reisch, "Chaos, History, and Narrative," and D. McCloskey, "History, Differential Equations, and the Problem of Narration," both in *History and Theory*, 1991, 30/1: 1-36. A. Abbott, "Temporality and Process in Social

Life” chapter 7, pp.209-39 in his *Time Matters*, 2001. I. Wallerstein, “The TimeSpace of World-Systems Analysis,” *Historical Geography*, 1993, XXIII, 1/2: 5-22. L. Isaac, “Reflections on Time, Causality, and Narrative in Contemporary Historical Sociology,” *Historical Methods*, 1997, 30/1: 4-12. And also the Symposium: “Rom Harré on Social Structure and Social Change,” *European Journal of Social Theory*, 2002, 5/1: 111-48, with comments by Harré, Carter, and Strydom. Interesting but difficult is Ernst Bloch’s “Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to Its Dialectics,” translated English version in *New German Critique*, 1977, 11: 22-38. Bender & Wellbery, eds., *Chronotypes: The Construction of Time*, 1991, is an instructive collection, theoretical and substantive.

Week 5 ***What If? Counterfactual History and the Agency-Structure Dialectic***
Feb. 3

Readings: Randall Collins, “The Uses of Counter-Factual History,” *Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift*, 2004, 31/3: 275-95. William Sewell, Jr., “Theory of Action, Dialectic, and History: Comment on Coleman,” *American Journal of Sociology*, 1988, 93/1: 166-172; and James Coleman, “Actors and Actions in Social History and Social Theory: Reply to Sewell,” *American Journal of Sociology*, 1988, 93/1: 172-5.

Supplemental: Selections from John Merriman, ed., *For Want of a Horse: Choice & Chance in History*, 1982; or from J.C. Squire, ed., *If It Had Happened Otherwise* [D210s7], 1972. Counterfactual reasoning receives renewed and sophistication attention in *Unmaking the West: ‘What If?’ Scenarios That Rewrite World History*, edited by Philip Tetlock, et al., 2006; and, more recently, *A Past of Possibilities: A History of What Could Have Been*, by Quentin Deluermoz and Pierre Singaravelou, 2021. W.H. Sewell, Jr., “A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation,” *American Journal of Sociology*, 1992, 98/1: 1-29. W. Outhwaite, “Agency and Structure,” and Margaret Archer, “Human Agency and Social Structure,” chapters 6 & 7 in Clark, Modgil & Modgil, eds., *Anthony Giddens: Consensus and Controversy*, 1990. M. Archer, “Morphogenesis versus structuration: on combining structure and action,” *British Journal of Sociology*, 1982, 33/4: 455-83. Perry Anderson, “Structure and Subject,” chap. 2, pp.32-55 in his *In the Tracks of Historical Materialism*, 1983, is luminous. See also Anderson on “Agency,” chap. 2, pp.16-58 in *Arguments Within English Marxism*, 1980. I revisit, analytically and empirically, the “great man theory” question in “Ashoka and Constantine: On Mega-Actors and the Politics of Empires and Religions,” Chapter 11 in *States and Nations, Power and Civility: Hallsian Perspectives*, 2019. A critical survey and synthesis of major European reflections is Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, *Social Action and Human Nature*, 1988. Nicholas Thomas, *Out of Time: History and Evolution in Anthropological Discourse*, 1989, is incisive on the hazards of ahistorical analyses in ethnography. For economics, Paul David, “Why Are Institutions the ‘Carriers of History’? Path Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions,” *Structural Change and Economic Dynamics* 1994, 5/2: 205-20. The most instructive explorations to date of the structure-event dialectic are offered by Marshall Sahlins, most notably “Structure and History,” chap. 5 in his *Islands of History*, 1985, and “The Return of the Event, Again,” chap. XI in *Culture in Practice*, 2000. His most recent work, *Apologies to Thucydides: Understanding History as Culture and Vice Versa*, 2004, offers illuminating case studies. Also relevant: Paul Secord, “Subjects versus Persons in Social Psychological Research,” chap. 11 in *Harré and his Critics*, edited by Roy Bhaskar, 1990; and Sherry Ortner, “Subjectivity and Cultural Critique,” *Anthropological Theory* 2005, 5/1: 31-52.

Week 6 ***Laws that “Cover” or Narratives that “Bind”?***
Feb. 10

Readings: Andrew Abbott, “Transcending General Linear Reality,” *Sociological Theory*, 1988, 6: 169-86 [Interview added]. David Carr, “Narrative and the Real World,” *History and Theory*, 1986, 25/2: 117-31. William Sewell, Jr., “Geertz, Cultural Systems, and History: From Synchrony to Transformation,” *Representations*, 59, 1997: 35-55.

Supplemental: Alan Donagan, “The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered,” chapter 5, pp.127-59, in William Dray, ed., *Philosophical Analysis and History*, 1966. “Symposium on Prediction in the Social Sciences,” *American Journal of Sociology*, 1995, 100/6: 1520-1625 (Hechter, Collins, Tilly, Kiser, Portes). A. Abbott, “From Causes to Events,” *Sociological Methods & Research*, 1992, 20/4: 428-55. Peter Hall, “Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research,” pp.373-404 in Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, eds., *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, 2003. Two classic meditations: Ortega y Gasset, “History as a System,” pp. 283-322, in Klibansky and Paton, *Philosophy and History: The Ernst Cassirer Festschrift*, 1963, and Isaiah Berlin, “The Concept of Scientific History,” *History and Theory*, 1960, 1/1: 1-31. The foundational statement for the covering-law position is Carl Hempel, “Explanation in Science and History,” reprinted as chapter 4, pp.95-126, in Dray, *Philosophical Analysis and History*, 1966. Informative and revealing is the recent Sica-Mahoney debate: James Mahoney, “Revisiting General Theory in Historical Sociology,” *Social Forces*, 2004, 83/2: 459-89, and Alan Sica, “Why ‘Unobservables’ Cannot Save General Theory,” pp.491-501, which continues online with Mahoney, “Reply to Sica: Epistemological and Ontological Debates in Historical Sociology,” and Sica, “Reply to Mahoney’s Rebuttal: Hunting the Grail with Realist Enthusiasm.” Another debate treatment is Philip Gorski, “The Poverty of Deductivism: A Constructive Realist Model of Sociological Explanation,” and Jack Goldstone’s comments, “Response: Reasoning About History, Sociologically ...,” with Gorski’s short reply, “The Varieties of Deductivism,” all in *Sociological Methodology*, 2004. Still valuable is Blumer’s classic piece, “Sociological Analysis and the ‘Variable,’” *American Sociological Review*, 1956, 21/6: 683-90.

***** **READING WEEK** Feb. 17-21

Week 7 ***History and Historiography I.***
Feb. 24 ***On Historical Evidence and the Logic of Hermeneutics***

Readings: Raphael Samuel, “Reading the Signs,” and “Reading the Signs II: Fact-grubbers and Mind-readers,” *History Workshop Journal*, 1991 (32): 88-109, 1992 (33): 220-51 [on the necessity & pitfalls of semiotical analysis]

Supplemental: Marc Bloch, *The Historian’s Craft*, 1953, especially chapter III: “Historical Criticism”. Raymond Aron, “Evidence and Inference in History,” pp. 19-47 in D. Lerner, ed., *Evidence and Inference*, 1959. G.R. Elton, *The Practice of History*, 1967, chapter II: “Research”. Peter Gay, *Style in History*, 1974, Conclusion, pp.183-217. David Hackett Fischer, *Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought*, 1970. For a practical guide on Ethnohistory, consult R. Barber and F. Berdan, *The Emperor’s Mirror: Understanding Culture through Primary Sources*, 1998. John and Jean Comaroff, *Ethnography and the Historical Imagination*, 1992, brilliantly put theory to practice. Nicholas Dirks, “Annals of the Archive: Ethnographic Notes on the Sources of History,” pp. 47-65 in Brian Keith Axel, ed., *From the Margins: Historical Anthropology and Its Future*, 2002. Peter Laslett, “The Wrong Way Through the Telescope: A Note

on Literary Evidence in Sociology and in Historical Sociology,” *British Journal of Sociology*, 1976, 27/3: 319-42. Paul Ricoeur’s magnum opus, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, 2004, is a comprehensive exploration; for a synopsis, see his “History and Hermeneutics,” *Journal of Philosophy*, 1976, 73/4: 683-95. Also valuable: Agnes Heller, “From Hermeneutics in Social Science Toward a Hermeneutics of Social Science,” *Theory and Society*, 1989, 18: 291-322; and Frederick Olafson, “Hermeneutics: Analytical and Dialectical,” *History and Theory*, 1986, 25/4: 28-42. Karl-Otto Apel’s *Analytical Philosophy of Language and the ‘Geisteswissenschaften’*, 1967, offers an insightful critical assessment of positivistic reasoning.

Week 8 ***History and Historiography II.***
March 3 ***On Historical Evidence and the Logic of Hermeneutics***

Readings: V. K. Dibble, “Four Types of Inference from Documents to Events,” *History and Theory*, 1963, 3/2: 203-21. Jennifer Platt, “Evidence and Proof in Documentary Research, I & II,” *Sociological Review*, 1981, 29/1: 31-66. Ann Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance” *Archival Science*, 2002, 2: 87-109.

Supplemental: Alison Wylie, “Archaeological Cables and Tacking,” *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 1989, 19/1: 1-18. G.S. Couse, “Collingwood’s Detective Image of the Historian and the Study of Hadrian’s Wall,” *History and Theory*, 1990, Beiheft 29: Reassessing Collingwood, pp.57-77. Joan Ramon Resina, “Historical Discourse and the Propaganda Film,” *New Literary History*, 1998, 29/1: 67-84. On the pictorial arts, Svetlana Alpers, *The Art of Describing*, 1983, a stimulating case study. On oral history, Luise White, “Telling More: Lies, Secrets, and History,” *History and Theory*, 2000, 39/4: 11-22. On museums, Susan Crane, “Memory, Distortion, and History in the Museum,” *History and Theory*, 1997, 36/4: 44-63. More generally, Wulf Kansteiner, “Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies,” *History and Theory*, 2002, 41/2: 179-97. Reinhart Koselleck’s *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, 2002, offers numerous insights.

Week 9 ***Emplotment, Rhetoric, & the “Historiographical Operation”:***
March 10 ***Assessing the Postmodernist Challenge***

Readings: Roland Barthes, “The discourse of history,” *Comparative Criticism*, 1981, vol. 3: 7-20. Hayden White, “The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory,” *History and Theory*, 1984, 23/1: 1-33. Raymond Martin, “Progress in Historical Studies,” *History and Theory*, 1998, 37/1: 14-39.

Supplemental: E.P. Thompson, “The Poverty of Theory or an Orrery of Errors,” pp.193-242 (sections i-vii), in his *The Poverty of Theory & Other Essays*, 1978. Hayden White, “Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth”; Perry Anderson, “On Emplotment: Two Kinds of Ruin”; and Martin Jay, “Of Plots, Witnesses, and Judgments,” chapters 2, 3, and 6 in Saul Friedlander, ed., *Probing the Limits of Representation*, 1992. Highly influential is Gérard Genette, “Fictional Narrative, Factual Narrative,” *Poetics Today*, 1990, 11: 755-74. See also the debate issues on “History and Post-Modernism,” in *Past and Present*, 1991, No. 131 (L. Stone), No. 133 (P. Joyce & C. Kelly), and 1992, No. 135 (Stone & Gabrielle Spiegel). Michel de Certeau, *The Writing of History*, chapter 2, 1988, offers his basic take. Insightful is Nancy Partner, “Making Up Lost Time: Writing on the Writing of History,” *Speculum*, 1986, 61/1: 90-117. For offerings by a leading hyper-constructionist, consult F.R. Ankersmit, *Historical Representation*, 2001.

Week 10 ***Reflexivity and the Quest for Objectivity:***
March 17 ***On Source Criticism and the Sociology of Knowledge***

Readings: Loic Wacquant, "Toward a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu," *Sociological Theory*, 1989, 7/1: 26-63; Joseph M. Bryant, "On Sources and Narratives in Historical Social Science," *British Journal of Sociology*, 2000, 51/3: 489-523.

Supplemental: An essential collection is the aptly named *Politics of Method in the Human Sciences*, edited by George Steinmetz, 2005. See also *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, by Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant, 1992. The classic statement is Karl Mannheim, chapter V: "The Sociology of Knowledge," pp.264-311, in his *Ideology and Utopia*, 1936. On historiographical controversies, see Chris Lorenz, "Can Histories Be True? Narrativism, Positivism, and the Metaphorical Turn," *History and Theory*, 1998, 37/3: 309-29. Instructive on the possibility of a fallible yet correctible objectivity is Kerry Whiteside, "Perspectivism and Historical Objectivity: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Covert Debate with Raymond Aron," *History and Theory*, 1986, 25/2: 132-51. The distinguished historian Carlo Ginzburg offers much valuable instruction in his *Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method*, 1989. Thomas Nagel, *The View From Nowhere*, 1986, is a brilliant meditation. Also important, Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*, 1995. On Post-Colonial epistemological reflections, see "Comments on *Orientalism*. Two Reviews," by Amal Rassam and Ross Chambers, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1980, 22/4: 505-12. A critically instructive take is Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures*, 2008 edition. Central to ongoing debates is Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 2007 edition. For an empirical exemplar from the dawn of the colonial period, see James O'Toole, "Cortes's Notary: The Symbolic Power of Records," *Archival Science*, 2002, 2: 45-61. Talal Asad, ed., *Anthropology & the Colonial Encounter*, 1973, is a classic early collection on the theme. Two other important works are Joan-Pau Rubiés, *Travel and Ethnology in the Renaissance: South India Through European Eyes, 1250-1625*, 2000, and Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*, 1992.

Week 11 ***Historical Sociology: Advocacy and Critique***
March 24

Readings: J. Goldthorpe, "The Uses of History in Sociology," *British Journal of Sociology*, 1991, 42/2: 211-30; "The Uses of History in Sociology: A Debate," *British Journal of Sociology*, 1994, 45/1: 1-77, papers by Bryant, Hart, Mouzelis, and Mann, with a reply by Goldthorpe.

Supplemental: J. Goldthorpe, "Current Issues in Comparative Macrosociology," *Comparative Social Research* 1997 (16):1-26; see especially the rejoinders by D. Rueschemeyer & J. Stephens, "Comparing Historical Sequences," pp.55-72, and Jack Goldstone, "Methodological Issues in Comparative Macrosociology," pp.107-20, and Goldthorpe's reply, pp.121-32. Stanley Lieberman, "Small N's and big conclusions," and Howard Becker, "Cases, causes, conjunctures, stories, and imagery," chapters 4 and 9, in C. Ragin & H. Becker, eds., *What is a Case?*, 1992. William Sewell Jr., *Logics of History*, 2005, offers a valuable collection of his many contributions on the necessary interplay of sociological and historical modes of analysis.

Week 12
March 31

Formalization, Quantification, and Historical Sociology

Readings: L. Griffin, "Narrative, Event-Structure Analysis, and Causal Interpretation in Historical Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1993, 98/5: 1094-1133. Roberto Franzosi, "A Sociologist Meets History: Critical Reflections upon Practice," *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 1996, 9/3: 354-92.

Supplemental: R. Franzosi and J. Mohr, "New Directions in Formalization and Historical Analysis," *Theory and Society*, 1997, 26: 133-60. J. Hall, "Temporality, Social Action, and the Problem of Quantification in Historical Analysis," *Historical Methods*, 1984, 17/4: 206-18. Larry Griffin and Marcel van der Linden (eds.) *New Methods for Social History*, 1999, offers a cutting-edge collection (on which see the review by Chris Lorenz). Challenging technically but critically important are the essays in *Causality in Crisis? Statistical Methods and the Search for Causal Knowledge in the Social Sciences*, edited by Vaughn McKim and Stephen Turner, 1997. See also Andrew Sayer, "Abstraction: A Realist Interpretation," *Radical Philosophy*, 1981, Summer, pp.6-15. On the academic politics of "method choice," see the illuminating article by John H. Summers, "Perpetual Revelations: C. Wright Mills and Paul Lazarsfeld," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 2006, 608: 25-40.

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Ashes denote that Fire was—

Emily Dickinson

*Description is revelation. It is not
The thing described, nor false facsimile.
It is an artificial thing that exists,
In its own seeming, plainly visible,
Yet not too closely the double of our lives,
Intenser than any actual life could be, ...*

Wallace Stevens, "Description without Place"

It is not sufficient for a theory to affirm no false relations; it must not hide true relations.

Henri Poincaré

Philosophy of science is, like all philosophies, not simply a rehearsal and recitation of what is done and said; it is also an analysis and an appraisal of the rationale and logical justification of scientists doing and saying what they do. Norwood Russell Hanson

The historical investigation of the development of a science is most needful, lest the principles treasured up in it become a system of half-understood precepts, or worse, a system of prejudices. Historical investigation not only promotes the understanding of that which now is, but also brings new possibilities before us by showing that what now exists is in great measure conventional and accidental.

Ernst Mach

Course Policy on use of Artificial Intelligence Tools.

Higher Education is guided by an all-important distinction between *knowledge* and *information*. Knowledge develops through the critical processing of information, i.e., identifying its reliability, significance, making connections with other facts and findings, making note of informational gaps, limitations, and possible biases. **Knowledge**, as acquired through learning and study, is thus something **you possess** or carry within you, as applied, creative, and responsive intelligence. **Information** consists of evidence, data, reports, etc., that **you access** and obtain from external sources. Artificial intelligence tools allow for new and impressive means for acquiring and presenting information, and will doubtless find expanding use within universities in the years to come. However, since the primary purpose of Higher Education is to promote and facilitate knowledge development, the use of AI technologies in our course is strictly restricted to information-gather functions. Accordingly:

Students may not copy or paraphrase any material created by generative Artificial Intelligence applications, including ChatGPT and other AI writing and coding assistants, for the purpose of composing and completing any of the research & writing assignments in this course.

[Specifically: the Reading Reflections; Research Essay; and Critical Reflection Commentary]

The knowing use of generative Artificial Intelligence tools for any purpose other than information-gathering may accordingly be considered an academic offense.

ACADEMIC INTEGRITY is fundamental to learning at U of T. Familiarize yourself with the *Code of Behaviour on Academic Matters*, at (<http://www.governingcouncil.utoronto.ca/policies/behaveac.htm>) . It is the University rule book for academic behaviour, and you are expected to know the rules.

PLAGIARISM POLICY: Whenever cases warrant, students will be required to submit their assignments to the University's detection tool for a review of textual similarity and other indications of possible plagiarism. In doing so, students will allow their essays to be included as source documents in the tool's reference database, where they will be used solely for the purpose of detecting plagiarism. The terms that apply to the University's use of this tool are described on the Centre for Teaching Support & Innovation web site (<https://uoft.me/pdt-faq>). For some of your assignments, we will be using the software *Ouriginal*. It uses text matching technology as a method to uphold the University's high academic integrity standards to detect any potential plagiarism. *Ouriginal* is integrated into Quercus. For assignments set up to use *Ouriginal*, the software will review your paper when it is uploaded to Quercus. For more on *Ouriginal's* privacy policy please review its [Privacy Policy](#). Students not wishing their assignment to be submitted through *Ouriginal* will be required to provide, along with their work, sufficient secondary material (e.g., reading notes, outlines of the paper, rough drafts of the final draft, etc.) to establish that the paper they submit is truly their own.

MISSED LECTURES: *Students who miss classes are expected to obtain lecture notes from classmates.*

MISSED ASSIGNMENT DEADLINES:

Students who miss an assignment deadline will receive a mark of zero for that assignment, unless the reason is a circumstance beyond their control. Within three days of missing an assignment deadline or test, students must send the instructor a request for consideration. This request must be supported by one of the following:

Absence declaration on ACORN (note: can be used only once in the semester);
U of T Verification of Illness or Injury Form;
College Registrar's letter (e.g., in case of personal/family crisis or emergency); or
Letter of Academic Accommodation from Accessibility Services

EXTENSION REQUESTS: Extensions for completing course assignments can only be given in accordance with University rules, which are limited to medical situations or family emergencies. Documentation will be required to establish compliance. Late papers without such documentation will not be accepted, and scored as '0' pts. Students who miss a test or are late in submitting an assignment **due to medical reasons**, need to email the instructor (not the TA), and declare their absence on the system (ACORN). For missed or late work **due to other reasons, such as family or other personal reasons**, students should have their *College Registrar* email the instructor as to relevant particulars.

Course Extensions – Extenuating Circumstances

Students are expected to submit course work on time. Occasionally, students may not be able to make agreed upon deadlines due to extenuating circumstances. Students are required to make arrangements with their instructors about how to submit late course work. The graduate office highly recommends that course work extensions remain within the term dates in which the course was taught.

Note: submitting work beyond the term end date (not the last day of instruction but the actual end of term, e.g., the last day of a winter term class may be April 3, but the term ends April 30) requires a discussion with the instructor and the graduate office, as well as completion of an SGS request for an extension of course work form. These forms will be considered by the graduate office and are not automatically approved.

ACCESSIBILITY SERVICES: If you require accommodations or have any accessibility concerns, please visit <http://studentlife.utoronto.ca/accessibility> as soon as possible.

WRITING ASSISTANCE

Students can find information about college writing centres at <http://www.writing.utoronto.ca/writing-centres/arts-and-science>. It is recommended that you **book appointments well in advance**, as the Writing Centres are commonly very busy.

See also the website Writing at the University of Toronto at www.writing.utoronto.ca. For numerous practical advice files, see www.writing.utoronto.ca/advice. Information about the English Language Learning program (ELL) is available at: <http://www.artsci.utoronto.ca/current/advising/ell>. There is also Reading eWriting, an online program that helps students engage course readings more effectively.